There is a substantial number of cases where the a priori relationship between products is not at all clear in the sense that although apparent to be clear substitutes may turn out to be in fact complements, or vice-versa. This paper aims to study the relationship between …xed and mobile telephony in the United Kingdom and, in particular, address the question if mobile communications crowded out …xed telephony or if, on the other hand, the two types of communications are in fact complements. We estimate a structural continuous-choice demand model following Pinkse et al. (2002) , Pinkse and Slade (2004) , and Slade (2004) and we …nd that at the current di¤usion stage, …xed and mobile communications appear to be complements. Given that the model is micro-founded, we also address the question of how the evolution of the price di¤erential between the two types of communication may, respectively, a¤ect the welfare of consumers and …rms. We …nd that the continuation of these price trends have substantial welfare bene…ts for subscribers and at the same time have no signi…cant impact on the pro…ts for …rms. Finally, we present some economic policy implications, especially about the need to (de)regulate telecommunications provision.
INTRODUCTION
There is a substantial number of cases where the a priori relationship between products is not at all clear in the sense that although apparent to be clear substitutes may turn out to be in fact complements, or vice-versa. Examples include print and online newspapers (Gentzkow, 2007) , free …le-sharing services and recorded music (Oberholzer and Strumpf, 2004; Blackburn, 2004; Rob and Waldfogel, 2006; Zentner, 2005) , …le-sharing services and live concerts (Mortimer and Sorensen, 2005) , public and private broadcast channels (Berry and Waldfogel, 1999; Prat and Stromberg, 2005) , and online and o-ine retailing (Goolsbee, 2001; Sinai and Waldfogel, 2004) . This paper aims to study the relationship between …xed and mobile telephony and, in particular, address the question if mobile communications crowded out …xed telephony or if, on the other hand, the two types of communications are in fact complements.
Historically, mobile phone service did not pose an attractive alternative to …xed service. Given its high relative price, mobile service was a luxury, not a substitute for …xed line. Mobile technology also lagged signi…cantly in nonprice terms: transmission quality and geographic coverage were poor by …xed-line standards. However, with time, the costs of mobile telephony start dropping, allowing prices to fall and quality to rise. Therefore, mobile became an increasingly attractive alternative to …xed-line service.
Technically, mobile is a substitute because users can place and receive voice calls just as they do with …xed service. Ultimately, users can even opt for the mobile phone network only.
An alternative view is that …xed and mobile services are complementary. Indeed, a call originating from mobile phones bene…ts …xed phone subscribers. Moreover, they are also being bene…ted by the increase in mobile phones because the number of phones that can be reached is increased.
There have been some prior studies analyzing the …xed-mobile substitution. Rodini et al. (2003) use a US household annual survey to study the mobile and …xed telephony, and …nd only modest substitution between mobile subscription and the demand for second lines. Sung et al. (2000) …nd that the number of Korean mobile subscribers is positively correlated with the number of …xed-line disconnects, but negatively related to the number of new …xed-line connections, suggesting net substitution between the two services. This pattern occurs even while the stock of …xed lines is positively correlated with the number of mobile subscribers, o¤ering evidence that the two services are complements. Ahn and Lee (1999) estimate demand for mobile access in Korea using more recent wireless subscription data for 64 countries, and …nd evidence of complementarity also using aggregate data.
The empirical literature on telephony communications is also signi…cant in what modelling is concerned, Doganolu and Grzybowski (2006) estimate a nested logit model to estimate the demand for subscriptions of mobile telephony, whereas Lee et al. (2006) estimate switching costs in the Korean mobile telecommunications using a random coef…cients multinomial model. Okada and Hatta (1999) estimate an almost ideal demand system for the Japanese telephony industry.
However, and even though in some settings the above approaches are clearly reasonable, in cases where the identi…cation of the degree of substitutability or complementary among products is the key parameter of interest, they may be inappropriate. The main drawback of the discrete-choice literature is that it tends to a priori restrict the di¤erent products to be either strong substitutes, independent or strong complements, whereas the continuous-choice setting, on the other hand, typically incorporates an add-hoc (and not a structural) error term.
We propose to estimate a structural continuous-choice demand model following Pinkse et al. (2002) , Slade (2004), and Slade (2004) . Our starting point is the speci…cation of an indirect utility function from which, via Roy's identity, a demand system is derived. We estimate the model using market-level data on the UK …xed and mobile communications. The data consists of a rich market-level panel that includes information on call volume, call revenues and network size from Ofcom -O¢ ce of Communications.
We complemented that data with information on the number of employees, operational costs and costs with employees from the AMADEUS database. Lastly, income information was obtained from the ONS -O¢ ce for National Statistics.
The UK market is of particular interest as the raw data is inconclusive about the relationship between …xed and mobile communications. On one hand, the overall slowdown in the proportion of mobile-only homes and the fact that calls to …xed lines still constitute the biggest share of an average subscriber's mobile use suggests that mobile remains primarily a complement to …xed-line rather than a direct substitute for most consumers.
On the other hand, survey …gures show that there is some element of substitution as around a …fth of consumers claim that they use their mobile as the main method of making and receiving calls. The solution to the nature of this relationship is therefore an empirical issue we propose to address. Given that the model is micro-founded, we also address the question of how the evolution of the price di¤erential between the two types of communication may, respectively, a¤ect the welfare of consumers and …rms.
Finally, we aim to propose some economic policy implications.
We …nd that at the current di¤usion stage, …xed and mobile communications appear to be complements and that the continuation of these price trends have substantial welfare bene…ts for subscribers and ta the same time have no signi…cant impact on the pro…ts for …rms.
The paper would proceed in …ve sections. The UK communications market would brie ‡y be described in section 2, whereas in section 3 we would discuss the relevant literature. In section 4, we would present the continuous-choice demand model and establish estimation issues. In section 5, we would introduce the data, discuss identi…cation and present the results. Section 6 would conclude.
THE UK TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET
Currently, the telecommunications industry in the UK is represented by six main network operators, two …xed and four mobile. 
% of housholds

Fixed only Mobile only Fixed&Mobile None
Source: Ofcom, 2006 means of telephony remained relatively small, standing at just 10% (see Figure III) . And it seems unlikely that mobile will replace …xed telephone as the main household access technology in the foreseeable future. The overall slowdown in the proportion of mobileonly homes suggests that mobile remains primarily a complement to …xed-line rather than a direct substitute for most consumers. In fact, despite their continuing decline, Source: Ofcom, 2006 mobile per-minute charges decreased slightly during 2005, however, mobile calls still cost on average 2.3 times more per minute than …xed calls, which may suggest that the two technologies are not substitutes (see Figure IV ).
RELEVANT LITERATURE
There is a substantial number of cases where the a priori relationship between products is not at all clear in the sense that although apparent to be clear substitutes may turn out to be in fact complements, or vice-versa. Examples include print and online newspapers (Gentzkow, 2007) , free …le-sharing services and recorded music (Oberholzer and Strumpf, 2004; Blackburn, 2004; Rob and Waldfogel, 2006; Zentner, 2005) , …le-sharing services and live concerts (Mortimer and Sorensen, 2005) , public and private broadcast channels (Berry and Waldfogel, 1999; Prat and Stromberg, 2005) , and online and o-ine retailing (Goolsbee, 2001; Sinai and Waldfogel, 2004) .
There have been some prior studies analyzing the …xed-mobile substitution. There is also a literature that analyses the impact of …xed phone on mobile phone di¤usion. Gruber and Verboven (2001a) , using a panel data on the whole history of the industry for all members of the European Union, …nd that the stock of …xed phones has a negative in ‡uence on the di¤usion of mobile phones. On the other hand, Gruber (2001) obtains the opposite result that mobile telecommunications are a complement to …xed line telecommunications rather than a substitute in Central and Eastern Europe. Gruber and Verboven (2001b) extend the analysis to world data and look at a di¤erent set of issues. Barros and Cadima (2000) study a complementary question, and …nd a negative e¤ect of the mobile phone di¤usion on the …xed-link telephony penetration rate. Taubman and Vagliasindi (2004) explore the substitution e¤ects between traditional …xed line and mobile services across Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union, and …nd evidence of some substitution in place at country level, but, at the enterprise level, the complementary e¤ects dominate. Hamilton (2003) studies the African telecommunications market and shows that is possible that mobile and main lines are sometimes substitutes, and at other times complements in consumption, even where …xed-line access is low. Okada and Hatta (1999) show that, for the Japanese market, the substitution e¤ect is substantial.
The empirical literature on telephony communications is also signi…cant in what modelling is concerned. Doganolu and Grzybowski (2006) estimate a nested logit model to estimate the demand for subscriptions of mobile telephony, whereas Lee et al. (2006) estimate switching costs in the Korean mobile telecommunications using a random coe¢ cients multinomial model. Grzybowski (2007) uses a multinomial and mixed logit model to estimate switching costs in mobile telephony. On the other hand, under the continuous-choice setting Okada and Hatta (1999) estimate an Almost Ideal Demand System for the Japanese telephony industry. Parker and Roeller (1997) , though focused on the mobile phone industry, estimate a structural model for the US mobile telephony industry to analyze the determinants of market conduct in the mobile telecommunications industry, and Hausman (1999 Hausman ( , 2000 estimates the elasticity of aggregate subscription to mobile service in the 30 largest U.S. markets over the period 1988-1993.
However, and even though in some settings the above approaches are clearly reasonable, in cases where the identi…cation of the degree of substitutability or complementary among products is the key parameter of interest, they may be inappropriate. The main drawback of the discrete-choice literature is that it tends to a priori restrict the di¤erent products to be either strong substitutes, independent or strong complements, whereas the continuous-choice setting, on the other hand, typically incorporates an add-hoc (and not a structural) error term. We propose to estimate a structural continuous-choice demand model following Pinkse et al. (2002) , Pinkse and Slade (2004) , and Slade (2004) with distinct advantages over the models under the standard approaches.
THE DEMAND MODEL
We propose to estimate a structural continuous-choice demand model following Pinkse Pinkse and Slade (2004) , and Slade (2004) with distinct advantages over the models under the standard approaches.
Consider a choice framework with J inside options, j = 1; : : : ; J, and an outside option, j = 0; that aggregates all other products. Within this setup, consumers choose quantities for the set = of those J + 1 options.
The hth consumer, with h = 1; : : : ; H, chooses a vector q h = (q h1 ; : : : ; q hJ ) 0 of quantities for the inside options, with q hj 0; j = 1; : : : ; J; and q h0 for the outside option, with q h0 > 0: Furthermore, this consumer has nominal income y h and indirect utility function u h (p;ỹ h ) ; wherep = (p 0 ;p 1 ; : : : ;p J ) 0 denotes the vector of nominal prices for the inside options and p 0 denotes the nominal price of the outside option.
We approximate the unknown functional form of the consumer indirect utility function, u h , by a second-order approximation that does not restrict the price-substitution patterns. In particular, we follow Berndt, Fuss and Waverman (1977) and McFadden (1978) , and opt to work with a symmetric quadratic functional form, where nominal prices and income are normalized by the price of the outside option p 0 ;
where for notational convenience, we denote p i =p
and p = (p 1 ; : : : ; p J ) 0 :
for all m and h. Then the above indirect utility function is a member of the class of consistent indirect utility functions, as it is i) a continuous function at all positive nominal prices and income, ii) non-increasing in a given nominal price, non-decreasing in nominal income, and homogeneous of degree zero in nominal prices and income, and
iii) a convex function of nominal prices with income normalized to one.
Proof. Follows straightforward from the derivatives of u h (p; y h ).
Given proposition 1, the demand system can, therefore, be derived by Roy's identity.
The demand function from individual h for a given product m is, then, given by,
where for notational convenience, we denote p m =p
The summation P i p i can be interpreted as a price index that can, without loss of generality, be normalized to one in a cross-section or very short time series, yielding the following demand function,
Because the indirect utility function is in Gorman polar form, the market-level demand functions can be obtained by simply aggregating the individual demand functions across consumers,
where q m denotes the market-level demand function for product m; and y = P H h=1 y h denotes aggregate income. Let us denote also for notational convenience, a m = P H h=1 a hm and b mj = 2 P H h=1 b hmj : Following this de…nitions, we can now rewrite the market-level demand function as,
At this point, the aggregate demand function is completely deterministic. As it is clear that some randomness exists in a applied demand model, we introduce the random utility hypothesis in a way akin to Pinkse et al. (2002) . We assume, therefore, that a m is a function de…ned in the characteristics space of product m, a m = a (x m ; m ) ; where x m denotes a K-dimensional vector of characteristics of product m, observed by both the consumer and the econometrician, and m denotes the value of product's m characteristics observed by the consumer but not by the econometrician. Although many functional forms for a (x m ; m ) are possible, we will assume the function to be linear in its arguments,
Given the above mapping of the market-level demand function can be rewritten as a function not only of prices and income, but also of a vector of characteristics
The unobserved characteristics m ensure that the error term is structurally embedded in the model.
An important econometric issue that arises when the model is taken to data refers to the substantial number of parameters to be estimated. This may lead to a dimensionality problem. To see this do note that, in addition to the f k g and f i g parameters, the number of fb ij g parameters to be estimated is J(J + 1)=2: We address this point by following Pinkse et al. (2002) , Slade (2004), and Slade (2004) , and map the fb ij g parameters in the characteristics space. We assume, therefore, the fb ii g parameters to be a function of own-characteristics, b ii = b (x i ), and similarly the fb ij g parameters, for i 6 = j; to depend on own-and cross-characteristics, b ij = g (x i ; x j ) : In particular, we will work with the following functional forms,
where Kd and Kc denote the number of characteristics included in the mapping of the own-and cross-price terms, respectively.
Given availability of data with both cross-sectional m = 1; : : : ; J and time series t = 1; : : : ; T variation, the model to be estimated becomes,
A second econometric issue relates to an hypothetical correlation between the regressors and the error term. We would expect prices and unobserved characteristics to be correlated as prices are typically set taking into account some information that the econometrician does not possess and, thereby, has to include in the econometric error term. Due to this hypothetical correlation, OLS estimates may not be consistent and instrumental variables techniques are, therefore, required. We assume, however, as it is standard in the literature, the unobserved characteristics to be mean independent of the observed ones (please see Berry, 1994) .
In many policy applications, including merger simulation, the key object of interest is the matrix of own-and cross-price elasticities. The analytical expressions for the ownand cross-price elasticities predicted by the model for any given products m and n; are the following, for m 6 = n (10) As the model is ‡exible in the sense that there exists a vector of parameters that can match any matrix of own-and cross-price elasticities (please see Pinkse et al., 2002 , Pinkse and Slade, 2004 , it can be instrumental in determining the relationship between two given products. De…nition 1 Products m and n; for all m 6 = n; are substitutes if 5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Data Description
The empirical application of the above estimation procedure relies on the availability of data on prices, income, observed quantities and characteristics for a set of J products across time.
In what refers to our UK communications application, we collected information on call volume, call revenues and network size from Ofcom -O¢ ce of Communications.
The data is on the form of a market-level cross-sectional time series for the United Kingdom telecoms market, and it is disaggregated by operator (BT, Vodafone, O2, .. Given the high degree of product di¤erences we present in Table II again the mean and standard deviation of the above variables, but now disaggregated between mobile and …xed communications. Table II shows i) that in fact exist a structural di¤erence between mobile and …xed communications, ii) that within mobile …rms the similarity, apart from revenues and consequently price, tends to be relatively high whereas iii) the same does not happen for …xed products as BT remains the biggest player with more than 56% of the volume of the …xed calls market in 2005. As a result our model has to take this aspect into consideration.
Reduced-form Results
Figure II shows that during these last years, the volume of …xed voice calls has been declining, while the volume of mobile voice calls has been increasing. A simple OLS regression of …xed voice volume on mobile voice volume and a time trend gives a signi…cantly negative coe¢ cient. Results are presented in Table III . Although it might be tempting to take this as direct evidence that the …xed and mobile telephony are substitutes, several factors make such a conclusion dubious. Our goal is to use a micro-founded demand model to answer this question. Asymptotically robust t-ratios in parentheses.
We can also …nd evidence about the extent of substitutability among operators offering di¤erent products. Calls from BT are signi…cantly negatively correlated with calls from Vodafone. However, they are signi…cantly positively correlated with calls from T-Mobile. With respect to the other mobile operators the correlation is not signi…cant.
The correlation between ntl:Telewest and Vodafone is also signi…cantly negative, as is the correlation between ntl:Telewest and O2. The other correlations are not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. These results suggest some ambiguity about the relationship between mobile and …xed calls. Again, this is exactly the question we propose to address with our paper by estimating a structural continuous-choice demand model. Let us proceed now with the econometric issues of its estimation.
Identi…cation
The demand speci…cation from equation (9) may give rise to an hypothetical correlation between the regressors and the error term .First, we would expect prices and unobserved characteristics to be correlated as prices are typically set taking into account some information that the econometrician does not possess and, thereby, has to include in the econometric error term. Furthermore, in a dynamic setting, an hypothetical correlation problem between observed and unobserved characteristics may also exist. As a result of these hypothetical problems, OLS estimates could be inconsistent and instrumental variables techniques are, therefore, required.
Our estimation procedure relies on two identi…cation assumptions. First, we will assume, as it is standard in the literature, the unobserved characteristics to be mean independent of the observed ones (please see Berry, 1994) . Second, in what relates to the hypothetical correlation between prices and unobserved product characteristics, we will assume two operational ratios to be valid instruments: the ratio of operational costs to volume and the ratio of costs with employees to their respective number. The justi…cation for these instruments relies on their likelihood to be simultaneously correlated with prices (via the …rms'cost structure) and uncorrelated with unobserved product characteristics. Table V presents the OLS and IV results for the estimation of the continuous-choice demand model 1 . As we described before, both the intercepts and the own-price terms are functions of observed characteristics, whereas the cross-price terms depend on distance measures. The …rst column presents, for comparison purposes, the OLS results, whereas the second column presents the IV estimates. The table shows that the OLS estimates of the coe¢ cients tend to be smaller than the IV estimates, as in Slade (2004) .
Demand Estimation
For the intercepts, the only observed characteristics included were product dummies to control for all those product speci…c characteristics that do not vary with time and time period dummies to control for time variations. In what the own-price e¤ects is concerned, we considered the following speci…cation for the mapping of the fb ii g parameters,
where DM OBILE i denotes a dummy variable that takes the value one if the product i is a mobile network and zero otherwise, and N ET W ORK i denotes the number of subscribers of product i. Given this speci…cation, an estimate of the f g parameters can be obtained as the estimated coe¢ cients on price, on price interacted with the DM OBILE variable (P RICEM ) and lastly on price interacted with the N ET W ORK variable (P RICEN ), respectively. The price coe¢ cient is negative and signi…cant. The coe¢ cients on both P RICEM and P RICEN are positive and signi…cant (although the later only at at 6%) suggesting that own-price sensitivity is lower for mobile and large size networks, respectively.
Turning to the cross-price e¤ects, captured by the fb ii g parameters, we assumed the following mapping which incorporates a mixture of a discrete-with a continuous-distance measure,
where DSAM E ij denotes a dummy variable that takes the value one if products i and j are of the same type, for example both …xed or mobile operators and zero otherwise, and conversely DOT HER ij denotes a dummy variable that takes the value one if products i and j belong to di¤erent types. This mapping gives rise to two rival price variables. One that considered the weighted average of those products that are of the same type (DIF N SAM E) and another considering the weighted average of those products that are of di¤erent types (DIF N OT OHER). In summary, the former variable allows us to obtain the cross-price e¤ects intra-categories, while the later gives us the intercategories cross-price e¤ects, in our case, between mobile and …xed calls. The coe¢ cient on DIF N SAM E is positive and signi…cant (although only at at 9%) implying that products of the same type are estimated to be substitutes. Conversely, the coe¢ cient on DIF N OT OHER is negative and signi…cant suggesting that products of di¤erent types are estimated to be complements.
A caveat should be emphasized about the validity of the estimated relationship between mobile and …xed communications. The data used in this paper refers to a mature di¤usion stage of mobile communications. We do not argue that mobile and …xed communications are and always have been complements in what the UK market is concerned.
Our point, in contrast, is that at this stage of mobile communication di¤usion characterized by a stabilization of the relative market shares, the data suggests that the two types of communications are complements. Each cell gives the % change in market share of the row's product with a 1% change in the price of the column's product.
Lastly, the coe¢ cient on income is not signi…cant, implying that at the current stage of di¤usion income tends to not be important in explaining the volume of minutes. According to our empirical speci…cation, own-price elasticities vary with the characteristics of the products, whereas cross-price elasticities depend on distance measures.
The implied own-price elasticities show that consumers tend to react in a similar way to own-price changes from mobile …rms. In contrast, in the …xed communications market, there is a substantial within di¤erence as the own-price elasticity for BT implies a relatively high degree of market power. In what the implied cross-price elasticities is concerned, the results suggest communications of the same type are demand substitutes, whereas communications of di¤erent types are demand complements. Furthermore, within each type the results also imply that consumers tend to switch more towards products with similar network sizes.
If we use the individual …rms elasticities to compute elasticities for …xed and mobile telephony in aggregate terms, we obtain the median own-and cross-price elasticities presented in Table VII . Each cell gives the % change in market share of the row's product with a 1% change in the price of the column's product.
In aggregated terms, mobile calls demand is therefore slightly more elastic than …xed calls with respect to own-price. A caveat should be emphasized about these results:
their magnitude of these results seem somewhat higher than some previous studies in the literature. However we have to emphasize that we were a priori expecting this qualitative result as the elasticities refer to i) volume and not subscription and ii) quarterly and not monthly data. Rodini et al. (2003) estimate a own-price elasticity of mobile access demand with respect to the monthly charge is -0.43. Hausman (1999) reports a price elasticity of subscription of -0.51 in the 30 largest U.S. markets. From the Ahn and Lee (1999) study it is possible to infer a elasticity of -0.36. Regarding …xed lines subscription, the own-price elasticity is -0.65 for the second …xed line and -0.1 for …rst …xed line, according to Rodini et al. (2003) . Parker and Röller (1997) apply a structural model in order to examine the competitive behavior of mobile operators, and …nd an ownprice elasticity of -2.5 using data on the United States covering the period 1984-1988. Doganoglu and Grzybowski (2005) estimate demand for subscription and …nds own-price elasticities between -4.2 and -5.04.
Turning to the cross-price, it seems there is no signi…cant di¤erence between how the volume of …xed communications reacts to changes in the mobile and vice-versa.
Again a similar caveat applies as the data refers to i) volume and not subscription,
ii) quarterly and not monthly data and iii) to a mature di¤usion stage for mobile communications. Rodini et al. (2003) estimates a cross-price elasticity of …xed access price on mobile demand of 0.13-0.18 and a cross-price elasticity from mobile access to …xed line subscription of 0.06-0.08. In what consumer welfare is concerned, when all consumers have indirect utility functions of the Gorman polar form, the preferences of the representative consumer are independent of the social welfare function used. In particular, the following is an admissible indirect utility function for the normative representative consumer (MasColell et al., 1995) ,
Welfare Evaluation
As a result, we can use our demand side estimates of ; fa i g and fb ij g to compute the impact the price trends had on utility. However, given changes in utility have no direct interpretation, it is necessary to translate those utility variations into a monetary measure. A well-known measure of monetary welfare change is the equivalent variation (EV) following Hicks (1939) . This measure gives us the change in income that would be equivalent to the price change in order for the welfare to be kept unchanged,
where p 0 and p 1 denote the vector of prices for all communication products in the market before and after the price changes, respectively.
Let us now turn to producer welfare. For …rms the change in welfare can be computed as the change in pro…t. Assume that the pro…t of a given …rm f can be expressed as follows,
where p f ; mc f and C f denote respectively price, constant marginal cost and …xed cost of production for …rm f . Additionally D f (p) denotes the volume demand of …rm f , which is a function of prices of all communication products in the market, p. Given the above, the impact on pro…t from a price change would be,
where the superscript 0 and 1 refer to variables before and after the price changes, respectively. The demand after the price changes can be predicted using the estimates from the demand side. However data on marginal costs, which we do not have, is
instrumental. As a result we can only perform a scenario analysis where we compute the change in pro…ts conditional on di¤erent marginal costs. We can argue that the marginal cost of a minute of communication is very close to zero if there are no capacity constraints issues. For this reason, we analyzed the impact on pro…ts for the cases where the marginal costs are 5%, 10% and 20% of the consumer price.
Table VIII presents the welfare impact results for both consumers and producers as a result of hypothetical future price trends. The …rst column presents the impact if past trends were to continue for a year, whereas the second column presents the results if those trends were to continue for a …ve year period. We …nd that on average a subscriber would be willing to pay £ 0.45 per day for the observed past decrease in prices to continue at the same rate for one year and £ 3.13
per day for the continuation of those price trends to continue for a …ve year period. In what the supply side is concerned, we …nd that …rms have no bene…t in continuing in the future with price trends of the same magnitude. This …nding is consistent with a reasonable range of marginal costs.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper studies the relationship between …xed and mobile telephony in the United Kingdom and, in particular, addresses the question if mobile communications crowded out …xed telephony or if, on the other hand, the two types of communications are in fact complements.
We estimate a structural continuous-choice demand model following Pinkse et al.
(2002), Slade (2004), and Slade (2004) and …nd that at the current di¤usion stage, …xed and mobile communications appear to be complements. Furthermore, we …nd the continuation observed price trends for both types of communications would have substantial welfare bene…ts for subscribers, at the same time it would not decrease pro…ts for …rms.
It is a known fact that competition generally tends to improve industry performance and productivity. Studies that looked at the telecommunications industry have …nd that competition in basic services is associated with increased telecom growth and development. By this reason, substitutability between …xed and mobile telephony services impacts public policy toward competition in both these markets. The main concern over competition in these markets derives from the market power held by incumbent …xed network. Our estimates indicate that mobile calls are not substitute, but a complement for …xed calls. Therefore we cannot expect the mobile services to constrain the market power of BT. On the contrary, the two services appear to coexist in households, each providing consumers with particular advantages. Hence, policies promoting the opening up of incumbent's network aided by regulatory intervention are still necessary.
